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Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict Kosovo Elena A. Baylis
Even as American attention is focused on Iraq's struggles to rebuild its political
and legal systems in the face of violent sectarian divisions, another fractured society-
Kosovo-has just begun negotiations to resolve the question of its political independence.
The persistent ethnic divisions that have obstructed Kosovo's efforts to establish a multi-
ethnic "'rule of law" offer lessons in transitional justice for Iraq and other states.
In Kosovo today, two parallel judicial systems each claim absolute and exclusive
jurisdiction over the province. One system is sponsored by the United Nations
administration in Kosovo and is mostly, although not exclusively, staffed by Kosovar
Albanians. The other system, run primarily by Kosovar Serbians, is essentially a set of
courts-in-exile, the remnants of the previous judicial system that existed before the Serbian
government was forced out of Kosovo by NA TO bombing in 1999.
The parallel courts present a transitional justice issue that is as crucial to
rebuilding Kosovo's post-conflict society as convening a truth commission or conducting
criminal trials. On one level, the existence of the parallel courts is a manifestation of the
ongoing political dispute over sovereignty. But for the residents of Kosovo, the lack of any
recognition of judgments between these systems has also created legal chaos in their
everyday lives. Conflicting judgments have been issued in civil cases, and criminal
defendants are subject to prosecution and punishment in both systems. The palpable
injustices that result from these conflicting judgments and repeated trials are undermining
confidence in the ongoing process of legal and political transition.
This Article undertakes an assessment of Kosovo's parallel systems and of the
existing legal models for recognition and enforcement of judgments, with the aim of
proposing an appropriate framework for Kosovo to recognize the Serbian parallel
judgments. Each of the relevant national and international models for recognition strives to
strike a balance between two competing values: (1) achieving certainty in the finality and
consistency of legal judgments; and (2) ensuring those judgments' essentialfairness. Using
these two values as a guide, this Article assesses whether and how the existing models
might be adapted to Kosovo 's context, concluding that the proper balance between legal
certainty and fairness will permit categorical recognition of most parallel civil judgments,
but will require case by case, discretionary review of criminal judgments. Finally, from this
analysis, this Article develops a set of factors for other transitioning states to consider
when faced with judgments from ethnic and religious legal institutions or other parallel
courts.
Shadow or Shade? The Roles of International
Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks Omar M Dajani 61
Pacta sunt servanda, the cardinal rule of international law, prohibits the breaking
of agreements. But what role should international law play in the making of agreements?
From late 1999 to early 2001, when Palestinians and Israelis undertook to negotiate a
"permanent status" agreement that would bring their century-long conflict to an end, they
expressed differing views not only about their respective rights and obligations under
international law, but also, more fundamentally, about the relevance of international legal
norms to the bilateral negotiation process in which they were engaged. Although a rich
body of literature has emerged around the parties" substantive legal claims, what continues
to be missing from the discussion is a theoretical framework for explaining the functions of
law in international peace negotiations and a detailed analysis of the functions
international law actually served in Palestinian-Israeli peace talks.
This Article is intended to help fill these gaps. Part II introduces a framework for
analyzing how law functions in international bargaining, and revisits the critical insight
that parties bargain "in the shadow of the law, " in that "the outcome that the law will
impose if no agreement is reached gives each [party] certain bargaining chips" in
negotiations. This approach facilitates an examination of how legal rules function to
promote efficiency and fairness by narrowing the scope of bargaining, framing trade-offs,
providing objective standards for evaluating competing claims, and filling in gaps in an
agreement. This Article then turns to exploring how these functions translate to the
international setting. "The shadow of the law" is diminished at the international level,
where norms are often under-developed and the adjudication and enforcement of legal
rights tends to be a remote prospect. However, the "shadow" metaphor fails to capture an
important function of law in international bargaining. As a growing body of literature
suggests, the influence of legal rules also derives from the normative force of the ideas it
embodies and its capacity to legitimize negotiated outcomes in the eyes of other
international actors and domestic constituencies. In this respect, international law may
influence the outcome of negotiations not only as a result of the shadow it casts, but also as
a result of the shade it offers-i.e., the attributes of legal rules that pull parties to align a
negotiated outcome with them, even when their ultimate enforcement is unlikely.
Applying this framework, Part III describes how law functioned-and failed to-
during Palestinian-Israeli permanent status negotiations. This analysis draws not only on
published accounts of the negotiations, but also on unpublished drafts, memoranda, and
minutes prepared by and for the Palestinian negotiating team during the talks. Finally, this
Article assesses the factors that constrained the functioning of legal rules in Palestinian-
Israeli peace talks, analyzing the consequences of the parties' disagreements about the
applicability and determinacy of legal rules and about the efficacy of the outcomes they
were claimed to prescribe, as well as the lack of recourse to external adjudication and
enforcement. It concludes by suggesting steps that may be taken by the parties and the
international community to address these factors.
Clearing a Path Through a Tangled
Jurisprudence: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
and Dispute Settlement Provisions in
Bilateral Investment Treaties Scott Vesel 125
International investment law is perhaps the most dynamic area of international law
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Since the creation of the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1965, individual investors have had
access to a neutral, international forum where they can bring claims in arbitration against
sovereign states-provided the host state has consented to the jurisdiction of ICSID in a
treaty with the investor's home state.
Foreign investors strongly prefer international arbitration to litigation in the courts
of the host state, which are often biased and almost always slow. Consequently, they have
employed a variety of arguments to gain access to ICSID arbitration or to improve the
terms of such access beyond what is provided for in the bilateral investment treaty (BIT)
between their home state and the host state.
In particular, a number of investors have invoked the most-favored-nation (MFN)
clause of their home state's BIT with the host state in order to justify access to the more
favorable dispute settlement provisions of a separate treaty between the host state and a
third state. These arguments have generated significant controversy-and seemingly
contradictory decisions-from the tribunals called upon to hear them.
Although, in the author's view, the recent arbitral decisions have generally reached
the correct results, the reasoning of the decisions has often been perfunctory, incoherent,
or, on occasion, dangerous. This Article seeks to provide these decisions with a firmer
foundation by analyzing the recent decisions in light of the historical development of both
the most-favored-nation clause and the field of international investment law. When viewed
in this context, the decisions no longer appear incompatible but rather the product of
tribunals deciding cases according to the specific texts of the relevant treaties and the
factual circumstances of the parties--despite what one might be led to believe by reading
the texts of the decisions themselves.
After reviewing the history and the case law, this Article conchdes that, as a
general matter, unless the BIT limits the scope of the MFN clause, the pledge of equal
treatment in an MFN clause applies broadly to all aspects of the legal regime applicable to
foreign investors, including dispute settlement mechanisms. Such application is more
consistent with the overarching purpose of such treaties, the establishment of an
environment for foreign investment that is marked by mutual confidence, stability of
expectations, and equality among investors. However, the MFN clause cannot be applied in
a way that would violate basic principles of international law, impose results that could not
have been intended by the parties, or otherwise disrupt the predictability and stability of
the international investment law system.
Notes
Deriving Lessons for the Alien Tort Claims
Act from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act Aron Ketchel 191
Since human rights advocates resurrected the Alien Tort Claims Act (A TCA) in
1980, the Act has generated a great deal of controversy among legal scholars,
multinational corporations, and human rights activists. In 2004, the Supreme Court quieted
some of the legal questions surrounding the A TCA by finding the statute was not merely
jurisdictional but also provided a narrow cause of action for violations of certain
customary international laws. But many important questions regarding the scope of the
A TCA were left unanswered and lower courts have struggled tofill in the gaps.
The greatest threat to A TCA claims, however, has come not from the courts, but
rather the Executive Branch. Since 2001, the Bush Administration has taken a new tack in
an effort to undermine the A TCA-the State Department has made repeated requests for
courts to dismiss A TCA claims under the political question doctrine, claiming the cases
would adversely affect U.S. foreign policy interests.
Executive Branch interference in foreign affairs law is not unprecedented. Just
thirty years ago, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to limit
similar interference in cases involving foreign states. No clear rationale exists for treating
A TCA and FSIA claims differently but this disparity has been overlooked in the current
A TCA debate. By drawing a comparison between the current environment in A TCA
litigation and the pre-FSA environment for cases against foreign sovereigns, this Note
argues that the political question doctrine is inappropriately applied in most A TCA claims
and that legislation should be enacted to reduce the influence of the Executive Branch in
judicial affairs.
The Use and Misuse of Secret Evidence in
Immigration Cases: A Comparative Study of
the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom Stephen Townley 219
Civil libertarians are outraged at the U.S. government's cloak-and-dagger
approach to immigration, both for independent reasons and because immigration law
increasingly has a national security valence. But the tolerance for secret evidence exhibited
by U.S. courts in immigration cases is anomalous in comparison to their approach in
ordinary, criminal cases. Through a careful study of the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, this Note adds nuance to the story told by civil liberties advocates. U.S.
courts have chosen not to prosecute terrorists, and so have not had to make hard
procedural choices concerning how they might do so. Rather, because U.S. courts have not
policed the line between criminal law enforcement and immigration law enforcement, and
have not questioned government motives, the U.S. government has been able to use
immigration law in place of criminal law infighting the War on Terror.
This Note also offers a variety of explanations for the observed difference between
the United States, on the one hand, and Canada and the United Kingdom on the other. For
instance, Canadian and UK. courts apply international law more rigorously than U.S.
courts; this has impelled them to scrutinize government motives. Likewise, the ease with
which the Parliaments in Canada and the United Kingdom can correct judicial missteps
affords those countries a flexibility to experiment with terrorism trials that the United
States lacks.
This comparative analysis, in turn, suggests that those who are outraged at the U.S.
government's approach may have more effective levers with which to change policy than
the Due Process Clause. This Note proposes both judicial and legislative fixes. On the one
hand, courts could use the same Fourth Amendment framework they use to evaluate
programmatic searches to discern whether immigration law is really being used for
immigration purposes. On the other hand, perhaps it is time for Congress to raise a wall
between criminal law enforcement and immigration law enforcement, similar to the one the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act creates between prosecutors and the intelligence
community.
